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Would Border Carbon Adjustments prevent carbon leakage and heavy industry competitiveness 
losses? Insights from a meta-analysis of recent economic studies 
Abstract 
The efficiency of unilateral climate policies may be hampered by carbon leakage and competitiveness 
losses.  A widely discussed policy option to reduce leakage and protect competitiveness of heavy 
industries is to impose Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA) to non regulated countries, which remains 
contentious for juridical and political reasons. The estimation of carbon leakage as well as the 
assessment of different policy options led to a substantial body of literature in energy-economic 
modeling. 
In order to give a quantitative overview on the most recent research on the topic, we conduct a meta-
analysis on 25 studies, altogether providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage ratios according to 
different assumptions and models. The typical range of carbon leakage ratio estimates are from 5% to 
25% (mean 14%) without policy and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCA. The output change of 
Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) sectors varies from -0.1% to -16% without BCA and from 
+2.2% to -15.5% with BCA. 
A meta-regression analysis is performed to further investigate the impact of different assumptions on 
the leakage ratio estimates. The decrease of the leakage ratio with the size of the coalition and its 
increase with the binding target is confirmed and quantified. Providing flexibility reduces leakage ratio, 
especially the extension of coverage to all GHG sources. High values of Armington elasticities lead to 
higher leakage ratio and among the BCA options; the extension of BCA to all sectors is in the meta-
regression model the most efficient feature to reduce the leakage ratio. Our most robust statistical 
finding is that, all other parameters being constant, BCA reduces leakage ratio by 6 percentage points.  
Keywords: Carbon leakage, Competitiveness, Border Carbon Adjustments, Meta-analysis, Meta-
regression analysis, Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models. 
 
Les Ajustements Carbone aux Frontières empêcheraient-ils les fuites de carbone et les pertes de 
compétitivité pour les industries lourdes ? Éclairages à partir d’une méta-analyse d’études 
économiques récentes 
Résumé 
L’efficacité des politiques climatiques unilatérales pourrait être réduite par les fuites de carbone et les 
pertes de compétitivité. Une option politique largement débattue pour réduire les fuites de carbone et 
protéger la compétitivité des industries lourdes est d’imposer des Ajustements Carbone aux Frontières 
(ACF) aux pays non contraints, ce qui reste controversé pour des raisons juridiques et politiques. 
L’estimation des fuites de carbone comme l’évaluation des différentes options politiques a conduit à 
de nombreuses études dans le domaine de la modélisation énergie-économie. 
 Afin de donner une vue d’ensemble de la recherche la plus récente sur le sujet, nous conduisons une 
méta-analyse de 25 études, représentant au total 310 estimations de taux de fuites de carbone selon 
différentes hypothèses et modèles. La plage de variation type des estimations de taux de fuites de 
carbone sont de 5% à 25% (moyenne 14%) sans politique et de -5% à 15% (moyenne 6%) avec ACF. 
Le changement de production des secteur Énergie-Intensifs et Exposés au Commerce International 
(EIECI) varient de -0.1% à -16% sans ACF et de +2.2% à -15.5% avec ACF. 
On effectue ensuite une méta-régression pour déterminer plus en détail l’impact des différentes 
hypothèses sur les estimations de taux de fuites de carbone. La diminution du taux de fuites avec la 
taille de la coalition et son augmentation avec la cible de réduction est confirmée et quantifiée. 
Proposer des mécanismes de flexibilité réduit le taux de fuites de carbone, particulièrement lorsque 
tous les gaz à effets de serre (et pas seulement le CO2) sont couverts.  Des valeurs élevées 
d’élasticité d’Armington conduisent à un taux de fuites plus élevé et parmi les options d’ACF, 
l’extension des ACF pour tous les secteurs est dans la méta-régression la caractéristique la plus 
efficace pour réduire le taux de fuites de carbone. Notre résultat le plus robuste statistiquement est 
que, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, les ACF réduisent le taux de fuites de carbone de 6 points de 
pourcentage. 
Mots-clés : Fuites de Carbone, Compétitivité, Ajustements Carbone aux Frontières,  Méta-Analyse, 
Méta-Régression, modèles d’Équilibre Général Calculable. 
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Would Border Carbon Adjustments prevent carbon leakage and
heavy industry competitiveness losses? Insights from a meta-analysis
of recent economic studies
Frédéric Brangera,1,∗, Philippe Quiriona,b
aCIRED, 45 bis, avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, 94736 Nogent-sur-Marne Cedex, France
bCNRS
Abstract
The efficiency of unilateral climate policies may be hampered by carbon leakage and competi-
tiveness losses. A widely discussed policy option to reduce leakage and protect competitiveness
of heavy industries is to impose Border Carbon Adjustments (BCA) to non regulated countries,
which remains contentious for juridical and political reasons. The estimation of carbon leakage
as well as the assessment of different policy options led to a subsantial body of litterature in
energy-economic modeling.
In order to give a quantitative overview on the most recent research on the topic, we conduct
a meta-analysis on 25 studies, altogether providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage according to
different assumptions and models. The typical range of carbon leakage estimates are from 5% to
25% (mean 14%) without policy and from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCA. The output change
of Energy Intensive Trade Exposed (EITE) sectors varies from -0.1% to -16% without BCA and
from +2.2% to -15.5% with BCA.
A meta-regression analysis is performed to further investigate the impact of different assump-
tions on the leakage ratio estimates. The decrease of the leakage ratio with the size of the coalition
and its increase with the binding target is confirmed and quantified. Providing flexibility reduces
leakage ratio, especially the extension of coverage to all GHG sources. High values of Armington
elasticities lead to higher leakage ratio and among the BCA options, the extension of BCA to all
sectors is in the meta-regression model the most efficient feature to reduce the leakage ratio. Our
most robust statistical finding is that, all other parameters being constant, BCA reduces leakage
ratio by 6 percentage points.
1. Introduction
International climate agreements are likely to remain sulglobal in the years to come: the global
climate architecture is shifting from a UNFCCC-led top-down regime to a bottom-up approach
(Rayner, 2010). Differences in Abatement targets among countries may lead to two dinstinct but
interrelated issues: carbon leakage and competitiveness losses, especially among Energy Intensive
Trade Exposed (EITE) sectors, such as Cement, Steel or Aluminium (Dröge et al., 2009). Indeed,
the asymmetry of carbon costs between regions may induce a shift of production of carbon inten-
sive products from carbon-constrained countries to less carbon-constrained countries. As carbon
dioxyde is a global pollutant, i.e. the geographic location of emissions has no influence on its
environmental impacts, this carbon leakage would reduce the environmental effectiveness of the
climate policies. Moreover, these production losses in heavy industries would also damage the
economy and involve job destructions.
Carbon leakage and competitiveness issues have been one of the main arguments against the
implementation of ambitious climate policies. A growing body of academic litterature has been
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: branger@centre-cired.fr (Frédéric Branger), quirion@centre-cired.fr (Philippe Quirion)
September 30, 2013
developped in the recent years to quantify the impacts of uneven climate policies and to find the
best policy measures to counteract them. Among them, Border Carbon Adjustements (BCA),
which consists in taxing products at the border on their carbon content, are widely discussed.
Their WTO consistency as well as their political consequences remain highly contentious among
legal Experts: they could constitute an incentive to join the climate coalition or trigger a trade
war because of green protectionnism suspicions.
Ex post econometrical studies haven’t revealed so far any evidence of carbon leakage (Reinaud,
2008; Ellerman et al., 2010; Quirion, 2011; Sartor, 2013) predicted in analytical models (Fischer
and Fox, 2011; Jakob et al., 2011; Hoel, 1996; Markusen, 1975). Ex ante modeling are dominated by
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) (Böhringer et al., 2012a) models but there are also some
sectoral partial equilibrium models (Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b).
Some litterature reviews have been published recently on the subject (Zhang, 2012; Quirion, 2010;
Dröge et al., 2009; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007) but to our knowledge no quantitative meta-analysis
has been made.
Meta-analysis is a method developped to provide a summary of empirical results from different
studies and test hypotheses regarding the determinants of these estimates (Nelson and Kennedy,
2009). It has been extensively used in medical research. The first meta-analysis in economics can
be traced back to Stanley and Jarell (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). In the field of environment and
resource economics, the majority of meta-analyses summarize the results of different nonmarket
valuation studies (Van Houtven et al., 2007; Brander and Koetse, 2011; Barrio and Loureiro, 2010;
Ojea and Loureiro, 2011; Richardson and Loomis, 2009). Closer to our subject, one can cite two
studies on marginal Abatement costs to mitigate climate change, one for all sectors (Kuik et al.,
2009) and the other specific to agriculture (Vermont and De Cara, 2010). An extensive review of
meta-analysis methods in environmental economics is given in Nelson and Kennedy (Nelson and
Kennedy, 2009).
In this article, we conduct a meta-analysis on 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012, altogether
providing 310 estimates of carbon leakage according to different assumptions and models. The
typical range of carbon leakage estimates are from 5% to 25% (mean 14%) without policy and from
-5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCA. We then do a meta-regression analysis to further investigate the
impact of different assumptions on computed results. Our model Explains 51% of the variance,
which suggests that variability between the models remains significant. Impact of key model
parameters, such as Armington elasticities, and policy features such as Linking carbon markets
or extending pricing to all GHG sources can be highlighted. We found that, all other parameters
being constant, BCA implementation reduces leakage ratio by 6 percentage points.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follow. Section 2 decribes the database and section
3 provides some descriptive statistics. The meta-regression model is Explained in section 4 and
results are discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Database description
The selection of studies for a meta-analysis is a decisive matter. Publication bias is a form
of sample selection bias that occurs if primary studies with statistically weak or unusual results
are less likely to be published (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009). For example, it has been widely
recognized to exagerage the effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (Doucouliagos and Stanley, 2009). In
our case, as we deal with model studies (no statistical significancy is involved), we believe that
the publication bias is less important than for statistical studies (especially in medical studies).
However a publication bias may remain for studies with unusual results1. Statistical techniques
to take this bias into account exist (Stanley, 2005; Rothstein et al., 2006) but only for statistical
studies. Our best option to address this issue was to embrace as many studies as possible without
artificially setting aside some of them, e.g. non peer-reviewed papers.
1Authors compare their results with those of the litterature and are able to change the settings or calibration of
their models to influence the results. Model comparisons may involve then a convergence of model results.
2
Many articles and working papers deal with carbon leakage and competitiveness issues but only
some of them are models giving ex ante numerical estimates. The body of litterature regarding
these issues also comprises ex post econometrical analyses, analytical models and political or
juridical studies (Cosbey et al., 2012; Ismer and Neuhoff, 2007; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b). The
criteria to be part of our sample was first to provide numerical estimations of carbon leakage with
a model. The second criteria was, since the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact
of Border Carbon Adjustments on leakage, to include BCA in the scenarios. To constitute our
sample, we searched for studies in standard search engines (Web of Science, Google Scholar, etc)
and cross references. Our sample is made of 25 studies dating from 2004 to 2012, most of them (14)
are part of the recent Energy Economics Special Issue. Some are grey litterature (MIT working
paper, World Bank working paper, etc), others are published in environmental economics journals
(Energy Economics, Energy Policy, the Energy Journal, Energy Policy, Climate Policy etc). The
majority are Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models relying on the GTAP database
(except for one), the others are sectoral or multi-sectoral partial equilibrium models. The number
of carbon leakage estimates per study varies from 2 (Weitzel et al., 2012) to 54 (Alexeeva-Talebi
et al., 2012a), with a mean of 12.6. The way to deal with “within studies/between studies”
variability is a major source of concerns for meta-analysis. In the next sections we’ll Explain how
we deal with it for descriptive statistics and meta-regression.
The common use of the leakage-to-reduction ratio or leakage ratio,
l = △ENonCOA−△ECOA
where △ECOA is emissions variation in the climate coalition between the climate policy scenario
and the counterfactual business-as-usual scenario, avoids us to make approximate conversions
between studies. In other words all studies calculate the same thing, which is necessary in a meta-
analysis as a “synthesis requires the ability to define a common concept to be measured” (Smith
and Pattanayak, 2002)).
In the majority of the cases results were available on tables, but sometimes they were taken
from graphs or derived from own calculation (Mattoo et al., 2009).
3. Descriptive Statistics
3.1. First sight
Figure 1 presents ranges of leakage ratio estimates for the 25 studies (mean, minimum and
maximal values with or without BCA). Leakage ratio estimates range from 2% to 41% without
BCA and from -41% to 27% with BCA. Eight studies find negative values of leakage ratio in case
of BCA, with three studies (Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004; McKibbin et al., 2008; Lanzi et al.,
2012) finding values below -15%. Internal variations (within one study) of leakage ratio estimates
range from almost null (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b) to relatively high (Mathiesen and Moestad,
2004; Bednar-Friedl et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012) depending on the scenarios and models.
Comparing scenarios by pair (with and without BCA, all the other parameters being con-
stant), we can observe that in all cases, BCA led to a reduction of the leakage ratio2. These
results are in constrast with (Jakob et al., 2011) who found that BCA could increase leakage
ratio3. For each pair, we calculate the leakage ratio reduction in percentage points (defined as
LeakageRatioReduction = LeakageRatioNoBCA − LeakageRatioBCA ). In the majority of the
cases, the leakage ratio reduction due to BCA stands between 1 and 15 percentage points, but
2In figure 1, for FF2012 (Fischer and Fox, 2011), the mean with BCA is higher than with no BCA. but the
“equivalent” BCA scenarios corresponds to the highest value of leakage ratio of the no BCA scenario (Europe only
abating).
3In this paper, under certain conditions, if in non coalition countries, the carbon intensity of Exports (“clean”
sector) is higher than those of local production (“dirty” sector), a reallocation of production induced by BCA from
“clean” to “dirty” sector would increase emissions in non coalition countries and then leakage ratio on a global scale
3
there are some outliers above 30 percentage points, where BCA actually generates negative leakage
ratios (McKibbin et al., 2008; Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004).
Apart from carbon leakage, competitiveness losses in energy-intensive industries constitutes
the other component of the climate trade nexus. Though extensively used in the public debate,
the notion of competitiveness remains ambiguous (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b). Some authors
consider that this notion is meaningless at the national level (Krugman, 1994). At the sectoral
level, it may refer to “ability to sell” or “ability to earn”. In CGE models, competitiveness is
most of the time implicitely defined as “ability to sell” and measured by gross output. In our
sample, 17 of the 25 studies show results of output change for industries. Based on GTAP sectors,
EITE sectors often regroups Refined goods, Chemical products, Non-metallic minerals, Iron and
Steel Industry and Non-ferrous metals (although sometimes Refined goods is aside). Some studies
present only disaggregated results by sectors, and not the output change for EITE sectors as a
whole. In this case, we use the average of the output of Iron and Steel and Non Metallic Minerals
sectors (or average of Iron and Cement) as a proxy for EITE sectors4.
The output change of EITE sectors varies from -0.1% to -16% without BCA and from +2.2%
to -15.5% with BCA. There is a clear dichotomy between CGE models where output loss range is
0%-3% (except for Alexeeva-Talebi 2012 (b) and Ghosh et al. 2012 where it’s a bit more (around
3%-7%)) and sectoral partial equilibrium models where output loss range is 8%-15%. In all cases,
BCA reduce the output loss among EITE industries5 and in five cases (Peterson and Schleich,
2007)(Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b; Kuik and Hofkes, 2010; Mattoo et al., 2009; Ghosh et al.,
2012), the output variation of EITE industries is even positive.
The welfare (or in some studies GDP) variation of the abating coalition ranges from -1.58%
to 0.02% without BCA and from -0.9% to 0.40% with BCA (the environmental impact is never
taken into account in the welfare estimation6). Though BCA improve welfare of coalition countries
compared to a no BCA scenario, they most of the time don’t reestablish a “neutral” situation (e.g
a variation near 0%), contrary to previously with the output of EITE industries. The welfare
variation is still negative after BCA, because the consumers of the coalition pay higher prices in
EITE sectors’ products. This improvement of welfare in coalition countries goes hand in hand with
a bigger degradation of welfare in non coalition countries. BCA have big distributionnal impacts:
they transfer a part of the burden to the non coalition countries (Böhringer et al., 2012c). In
the studies that report it (Böhringer et al., 2012c; Lanzi et al., 2012; Mattoo et al., 2009), global
welfare is decreasing with BCA.
3.2. Merging studies
Gathering all the estimates of carbon leakage in the 25 studies, we compute kernel density
estimations for the estimates accross all studies. As the number of estimates varies greatly (from
2 to 54) accross studies, we consider two ways of merging results, the “scenarios equality” method
and the “articles equality” method. In the “scenarios equality” method, we add all estimates
regardless of the article they are from. Then an article with N estimates “weights” N/2 times
more in the final distribution than an article with only two estimates. In the “articles equality”
method however, weights are put on estimates to assure that each article “weights” the same in the
final distribution7. By this process the distribution of results with the “articles equality” method
is less smooth because there are artificially some accumulation in the distribution. However the
4For the only two studies where output changes were available both by sector and for EITE sectors as a whole
(Lanzi et al., 2012; Ghosh et al., 2012), it was a correct proxy. Iron and Steel (resp. Non Metallic Minerals) being
a bit less (resp. more) impacted than EITE as a whole
5However in the CASE model (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a,b), cement output is more reduced in the presence
of BCA
6In the Energy Economics special issue, leakage is endogenously compensated by a higher Abatement to assure
a same environmental impact in all scenarios in order to compare welfare variations
7If Nk is the number of estimates in the article k, the weight for an estimate from article i is then
maxk(Nk)
Ni
(and the closest integer value for kernel estimate using Stata). In this case each article weights maxk(Nk) in the
final distribution.
4
distributions share the same shape with both results, especially for the leakage ratio and the
output variation of EITE industries, which can be interpretated as a sign of the robustness of the
results.
Both leakage ratio distribution and EITE output change distribution are bimodal. For leakage
ratio without BCA there is a concentration around 5% and another around 12%8. We can see
that a leakage ratio above 100%, theoretically possible if the carbon content of products is higher
outside the climate coalition is well out of the range of estimates in the litterature. For EITE
output variation there is a concentration at -2% and another one (more spread out) at -7% (the
dichotomy CGE models/PE models). The coalition welfare variation distribution is unimodal,
with a mode of -0.6% without BCA and -0.3% with BCA.
One can easily visualize in figures 6 and 7 the impact of BCA in reducing leakage ratio, restoring
some competitiveness and to a lesser extent improving coalition welfare with the left shift of the
leakage ratio distribution and the right shifts of the output change and coalition welfare change
distributions.
8Not a single estimate of leakage ratio is negative without BCA, the negative part is an artifact in the kernel
density estimation
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Figure 1: Leakage ratio in selected studies (mean, minimum and maximal values with or without
BCA), ranked by mean value without BCA
Figure 2: Leakage ratio reduction in case of Border Carbon Adjustment (same ranking as in
figure 1)
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Figure 3: Output change of EITE industries in selected studies (ranked by mean value without
BCA)
Figure 4: Welfare variation in abating coalition (ranked by mean value without BCA)
Figure 5: Leakage ratio (Kernel density estimates) with the two methods of merging, “scenarios
equality” and “articles equality”
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Figure 6: Output change of EITE industries (Kernel density estimates) for two cases. scenarios
equality and articles equality
Figure 7: Welfare variation (Kernel density estimates) for two cases. scenarios equality and
articles equality
Figure 8: BCA leakage reduction (in percentage points)
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4. Meta-regression: the model
Meta-regression is widely used in meta-analysis as it is an interesting way to go beyond standard
litterature review by combining numerical results from different studies in a statistical manner
(Vermont and De Cara, 2010; Kuik et al., 2009; Horváthová, 2010). Several econometric problems
occurs during this exercice: data heterogeneity, outliers, heteroskedasticity in effect size variance,
non independance of observations of the same primary studies (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009).
Hetereroskedasticity in effect size variance is usually treated by weighting observations by
the inverse of variance estimations or sample size (Van Houtven et al., 2007). As we deal with
simulation model results and not statistical studies results this method is irrelevant. One may think
that among all studies some are more relevant or better than others and should then be weighted
more, but we think that putting weights based on the “quality” of the studies would have been
too arbitrary. Heterogeneity is addressed with the use of methodological and hypotheses variables
in the meta-regression and by attemps to avoid a publication bias as discussed above.
Regarding the non independance of observations of the same primary studies, some authors
favor the use of a single estimate per study (Stanley, 2001) but this shrinks dramatically the pool
of estimates. In our case we treat this issue with a “cluster-robust” estimator based on Huber and
White (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) (as in (Kuik et al., 2009; Vermont and De Cara, 2010)): the
observations are gathered in 15 clusters (see table 1). Studies with many observations are the first
clusters9, then studies that share common features are gathered in same clusters (2 or 3 studies
per cluster representing 10-15 observations)10.
To treat outliers, we have developped a routine based on the rreg Stata command, which
performs a robust regression using iteratively reweighted least squares. First we make a robust
regression using this algorithm and keep the final weights. Then we dismiss data that are weighted
below a certain threshold (5%)11. Finally we make a cluster-robust regression on this reduced
sample. We show both results (with and without dismissing outliers) in table 3 and one can see
that, with only about 10% of data in the sample dismissed, outliers-free results are much more
significant.
We test three variations of the two models: one for all leakage ratio estimates, one for no BCA
estimates and the last one for BCA estimates:
Leakage = Const + β1GE + β2Coasize + β3Abatement + β4Link+β5Offset + β6GHG + β7Armington + β8BCA + u
LeakageNoBCA = Const + β1GE + β2Coasize + β3Abatement + β4Link+β5Offset + β6GHG + β7Armington + u
LeakageBCA = Const + β1GE + β2Coasize + β3Abatement + β4Link+β5Offset + β6GHG + β7Armington + β9Exp+β10Foreign + β11AllSect + β12Indirect + u
The first variables used are GE (a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the model is a CGE).
Coasize (the size of the abating coalition in percentage of worldwide emissions). Abatement (the
9With the exception of (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a,b) which are merged because results are from the same
model CASE II
10We tested different clusters without significant changes. Results are available upon demand
11Several values were tested and 5% was the best compromise to have significant results without dismissing too
many values. 21 out of the 25 studies had less than one result dismissed and 2 studies had a significant share of
dismissed results (Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004; Peterson and Schleich, 2007) which have relatively high estimates
of leakage ratio).
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Abatement target)12. Then we have three dummy variables related to scenarios Link (if permit
trading is authorized between the different regions of the coalition13). Offset (if Offset credits
are authorized) and GHG (if all carbon sources, and not only CO2 are considered).
Armington elasticities, which are used to model international trade, are considered as a crucial
parameter in leakage ratio estimates (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a; Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012a;
Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012). Most of the time they were not Explicitely displayed in the
articles. However some studies made sensitivity analyses on this parameter (for example doubling
or dividing in half the original values). In the meta-analysis, the Armington parameter is then
not a numerical value but an “almost dummy” Linked with “high” (+1), “low” (-1), “very high”
(+2) or “very low” (-2) Armington elasticities values14 when sensitivity analysis were performed
on these parameters. It would have been interesting to incorporate a parameter for the fossil fuel
supply elasticity which is recognized to be determinant in the leakage ratio estimations for the
international fossil fuel channel (Light et al., 1999; Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007). However, because
they weren’t available most of time, it was decided not to take them into account in the meta-
regression.
BCA is another dummy which takes the value of 1 if BCA is implemented and four dummy
parameters detail the policy features of the BCA: Exp (if Export rebates are part of the scheme),
Foreign (if the adjustement if based on foreign specific emissions, instead of home specific emis-
sions or best available technology). AllSect (if the adjustment concerns all sectors and not only
EITE sectors), and indirect (if indirect emissions are taken into account in the adjustment). Table
2 summarizes information about the regression variables.
12The logarithm of Coasize and Abatement have been tried as variables without changing the statistical signifi-
cancy of the results
13which supposes that the abating coalition is composed of more than one region in the model
14In (Balistreri and Rutherford, 2012) the Melitz structure (Melitz 2003) is considered equivalent to “very high”
Armington
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5. Discussion of the results
Interpreting the results, one must bear in mind that, though meta-regression analysis is a
powerful tool to incorporate all the sources of variability in a single model, one should not give
excessive credit to the results. Indeed, the calcultated coefficients depends both on primary models
that made different assumptions but also on the statistical variability of the parameters which is,
except for the variable BCA, far from being perfect. For example Abatement is set at 20% for 61%
of the cases and varies within two studies only (Böhringer et al., 2012a; Demailly and Quirion,
2008). Indirect is set at the value 1 for 91% of the cases and varies within two studies only
(Böhringer et al., 2012c; Monjon and Quirion, 2011b). This aspect is unavoidable in a meta-
regression analysis as we take already made studies and don’t design the scenarios by ourself. We
still include these “poorly variable” variables in the regression, knowing that despite statistical
methods designed to capture the slighest statistical effects, they may not appear as statistically
significant as they may have been or that the value of the coefficients may be biased.
The meta-regression Explains respectively 29%, 20% and 48% of the variance in the leakage
ratio estimation in the standard model (for All, No BCA estimates and BCA estimates) and
46%, 47% and 60% without outliers. The relatively higher values of the outlier-free models (where
roughly values of (Peterson and Schleich, 2007) and (Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004) are dismissed)
indicate that estimates of recent models are converging. However the share of unExplained vari-
ability (mainly due to differences between models) remains high: about half of the variability in
the estimates can’t be Explained in our meta-regression model. In the following, we will discuss
the results of the outlier-free model (in terms of numerical values) because results are more signif-
icant. However, these results don’t depart notably from the standard model and roughly the same
conclusions could be made with the standard model results but with less statistical significancy.
The difference between CGE models and other models is statistically significant and is posi-
tive. We find that, all other parameters being constant, leakage ratio without BCA policy is 6
percentage points higher in CGE models and a bit less than the double under BCA policy, which
is a noteworthy difference. The lack of non CGE models estimates (they constitute only 13% of
studies) must remind us to interpret these results with caution. An Explanation could be that
CGE models include both channels of leakage ratio, the competitiveness channel and the inter-
national fossil fuel channel, which is recognized to predominate (Gerlagh and Kuik, 2007; Fischer
and Fox, 2011; Weitzel et al., 2012) whereas partial equilibrium models only include the first one
(except for (Mathiesen and Moestad, 2004)).
The coefficient for the coalition size is positive and statistically significant. Changing the size
of the coalition from Europe (15% of world’s emissions in 2004) to Annex 1 plus China except
Russia (71% of world’s emissions in 2004) would involve in the model a decrease of leakage ratio
of about 7 percentage points.
Theoretically, the bigger is the Abatement, the higher is the leakage in absolute terms (tons of
carbon emissions). As the leakage ratio is the leakage in absolute terms divided by the Abatement
and this latter increases as well, there is an indeterminacy about the relationship between the
Abatement and the leakage ratio. In the meta-regression model, the correlation is positive, but
the statistical significancy is weak. In (Alexeeva-Talebi et al., 2012b) (which was not included in
our study because there was no BCA), the correlationship is negative (leakage of 32%, 29% and
27% for Europe abating respectively 10%, 20% and 30% of its emissions). In (Böhringer et al.,
2012b) however, the relationship is positive (leakage of 15.3%, 17.9% and 21% for Europe abating
respectively 10%, 20% and 30% of its emissions).
Concerning the policy parameters, authorizing permit trading (Linking) is not statistically
significant, but the use of Offset credits as well as extending carbon pricing to all GHG sources
is. All other parameters being fixed, the use of Offset credits would reduce the leakage ratio by
about 8 percentage points (but the coefficient isn’t statistically significant when there are BCA),
which is the same order of magnitude for the effect of taxing all GHG sources.
The Armington parameter proves statistically significant for All and no BCA leakage ratio
estimates and is positive as Expected. A higher value, meaning a more “flexible” international
trade modeled, induces more impact of price differentiation accross regions on trade flows, and
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therefore more leakage ratio. In our meta-regression model, taking high values of Armington
elasticities instead of low values would then lead to leakage ratio estimates about 2x1.7=3.4
percentage points higher.
With a very high p-value, we find that the BCA parameter is statistically significant and is
negative. All other parameters being constant, BCA implementation reduces the leakage ratio
by 6.3 percentage points. This statistical finding fits the data in the descriptive statistics section
(figure 8). More specifically, among the BCA options, including all sectors instead of only EITE
sectors would have the most important impact (decrease of 10.7 percentage points of the leakage
ratio) followed by the inclusion of export rebates (decrease of 4.1 percentage points) and basing
adjustement on foreign specific emissions instead of home specific emissions (decrease of 2.7 per-
centage points). In this meta-regression model it is then the BCA option with high administrative
costs (adjustment to all sectors) rather than the politically and juridically risky options (export
rebates and especially foreign carbon content based adjustment) that would be the most efficient
to reduce leakage. The inclusion of indirect emissions is without surprise not statistically signifi-
cant (there are very little statistical variability for this parameter). In the two studies where this
feature is included in the scenarios, it is proven to reduce leakage: in (Böhringer et al., 2012a),
from 0.5 to 2 percentage points, depending on the adjustment level (Böhringer et al., 2012c), and
in (Monjon and Quirion, 2011a), from 1.5 to 2 percentage points.
Meta-regression results can also be used to make out-of-sample predictions, which is called
benefit transfer (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009; Van Houtven et al., 2007). This exercice is especially
interesting for meta-analysis of empirical studies as they allow forecast for other locations or
commodities which may save the employed ressources to make additional surveys. Here we show
as an example the results of leakage ratio estimations with the meta-regression analysis coefficients
for different abating coalitions and policies (see table 4). The estimated values of leakage ratio
seem reasonable but the 95% confidence intervals are wide.
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Table 3: Meta-regression Results
All Outliers-free No BCA Outliers-free BCA Outliers-free
GE 0.042 0.087 0.004 0.059 0.107 0.106
(1.09) (8.04)*** (0.26) (4.32)*** (2.95)** (6.84)***
Coasize -0.056 -0.141 -0.010 -0.126 -0.113 -0.139
(0.82) (6.08)*** (0.27) (5.02)*** (2.82)** (4.62)***
Abatement 0.124 0.084 0.062 0.273 0.117 0.207
(0.32) (0.93) (0.40) (2.23)** (0.30) (1.60)
Link 0.007 0.015 -0.015 0.012 0.036 0.020
(0.30) (1.54) (0.90) (0.76) (1.59) (1.61)
Offset -0.079 -0.078 -0.080 -0.072 0.024 0.020
(3.94)*** (6.04)*** (3.30)*** (6.54)*** (0.58) (1.06)
GHG -0.083 -0.078 -0.066 -0.052 -0.059 -0.054
(4.73)*** (4.65)*** (2.32)** (3.54)*** (2.58)** (2.31)**
Armington 0.019 0.017 0.030 0.027 0.003 0.005
(3.43)*** (2.74)*** (3.08)*** (6.58)*** (0.88) (0.57)
BCA -0.081 -0.063
(4.83)*** (9.22)***
Exp -0.073 -0.041
(2.59)** (2.79)***
Foreign -0.021 -0.027
(1.16) (2.71)***
AllSect -0.115 -0.107
(2.95)** (9.37)***
Indirect 0.005 0.002
(0.20) (0.09)
Constant 0.103 0.084 0.134 0.062 0.077 0.048
(1.60) (4.70)*** (4.32)*** (2.95)** (1.06) (1.83)*
R2 0.29 0.46 0.20 0.47 0.48 0.60
N 310 293 144 131 166 160
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Abating coalition Europe A1xR A1xR+China
No BCA (a) 17% (7% 27%) 12% (1% 24%) 10% (-3% 22%)
"light" BCA (b) 7% (-10% 23%) 6% (-16% 21%) 0% (-20% 19%)
"strong" BCA (c) 0% (-21% 21%) -4% (-27% 19%) -7% (-31% 17%)
A1xR: Annex 1 without Russia
(a) estimation with the “All” model
(b) estimation with the “BCA” model. AllSect = 1 only
(c) estimation with the “BCA” model. AllSect = 1. Foreign = 1 and Exp = 1
Table 4: Leakage ratio estimations by the meta-regression model (20% Abatement target)
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6. Conclusion
A global climate policy is unlikely to be implemented in the years to come and the adoption of
ambitious national or regional climate policies is hindered by claims of industry competitiveness
losses and carbon leakage. Border Carbon Adjustment (BCA) has been proposed to overcome
these hurdles but its potential efficacy has been controversial. Moreover some authors argue that
BCA aims at protecting heavy industries competitiveness rather than at tackling leakage (Kuik
and Hofkes, 2010) while other authors defend that BCA implementation cannot be justified only for
competitiveness motives (Cosbey et al., 2012). Finally, BCA proposals differ by key design choices
such as the coverage of exports and imports or only of imports, the inclusion of indirect (electricity-
related) emissions, or the adjustment level, which can be the domestic or foreign average specific
emissions, or best-available technologies. How BCA performance would be impacted by these
choices remains an open question.
To shed some light of these issues, we have gathered and analysed 310 estimates of carbon
leakage and output loss in Energy-Intensive Trade-Exposed (EITE) sectors from 25 studies dat-
ing from 2004 to 2012. A meta-regression is then conducted to capture the impact of different
assumptions on the model results.
Across our studies, the leakage ratio ranges from 5% to 25% (mean 14%) without BCA and
from -5% to 15% (mean 6%) with BCA. The main contribution of this article is that BCA does
reduce the leakage ratio with robust statistical significance: all parameters in the meta-analysis
being constant, the ratio drops by 6 percentage points with the implementation of BCA. In most
CGE models some leakage remains after BCA implementation, which is not the case with partial
equilibrium (PE) models. The most likely Explanation is that in CGE models, a part of leakage
is due to the international fossil fuel price channel which is unaffected by BCA, while most PE
models do not feature this leakage channel.
Concerning output loss for EITE industries, results are in sharp contrast to results about
leakage: CGE models predict loss in a range from 0% to 4% (mean 2%) without BCA while PE
models foresee more than the double. BCA corrects for the output loss in CGE models but less
so in sectoral models. The Explanation seems that in PE models, a higher output loss is due to a
drop in demand for CO2-intensive materials, loss which is mitigated by BCA.
The features of BCA (coverage, level of adjustment, etc.) are of the highest importance for the
WTO consistency, feasibility, and political acceptability. The purpose of the meta-regression was
also to assess their impact on competitiveness and leakage. In the meta-regression, the inclusion of
all sectors in the scheme appears to be the most efficient feature to reduce leakage ratio, followed
by the inclusion of export rebates and adjustment level based on foreign carbon content. Yet one
can guess, in the case of hypothetical BCA implementation, that political and juridical aspects
will be the more determinant and that only a “light” version (adjustment based on best available
technologies, probably without the inclusion of indirect emissions) is likely to see the light of day.
Besides, the importance of the coalition size and the Abatement target are statistically con-
firmed and quantified: the smaller the abating coalition and the more stringent the cap, the bigger
the leakage ratio. Policy features providing where and what flexibility (the possibility of Offsets
and extension to all greenhouse gases) reduce the leakage ratio.
Finally, this meta-analysis confirms the importance of Armington elasticities in the leakage
ratio estimation, a result crucial in terms of uncertainty analysis. This calls for more transparency
and sensitivity analyses regarding these parameters in future studies.
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